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KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD

N

In the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and as a result of widespread
calls for a reform of the financial regulatory system, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Dodd-Frank called for a number of legal and
regulatory changes in the financial industry, including possible reform of
the duties imposed on broker-dealers. Currently, broker-dealers are not held
to a fiduciary standard. This note contends that despite the inherent dangers
currently existing in broker-dealer firms, the implementation of a fiduciary
standard is not the solution. Rather, the solution comes from a change in
how violations of existing rules are currently policed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
I.	Introduction

Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010 as a response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis1 and with an eye
toward preventing a reoccurrence.2 Dodd-Frank aimed to fill the perceived “gaps” in the
existing regulatory system3 in an effort to promote stability and prevent further fraud and
abuse in the markets.4 At 848-pages long,5 Dodd-Frank contains some of the most
sweeping revisions to the current federal regulatory system since the Great Depression.6
1.

The financial crisis cost the U.S. economy an estimated $22 trillion. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, GAO-13-180, Financial Regulatory Reform: Financial Crisis Losses and Potential
Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act 16–17, 21 (2013) (estimating $22 trillion by adding up the loss of
U.S. domestic output, which declined by $13 trillion, and the loss of U.S. homeowner equity, which was
roughly $9.1 trillion). The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations called the crisis the “result of high
risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conf licts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the
credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.” Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse 1 (2011) [hereinafter Levin-Coburn Report].

2.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 7, 12, 15, and 31).

3.

Arthur B. Laby, Implementing Regulatory Harmonization at the SEC, 30 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 189,
189 (2010).

4.

E.g., Levin-Coburn Report, supra note 1. Liz Moyer, How Regulators Missed Madoff, Forbes (Jan. 27,
2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/bernard-madoff-sec-business-wall-street_0127_
regulators.html (“Our current fragmented regulatory system can allow bad actors to engage in
misconduct outside the view and reach of some regulators.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

5.

Dodd-Frank delegated a substantial portion of rulemaking to federal agencies, requiring them to write 398
new rules. As such, the current length of Dodd-Frank spans nearly 14,000 pages. Joe Mont, Three Years In,
Dodd-Frank Deadlines Missed as Page Count Rises, Compliance Wk. (July 22, 2013), http://www.
complianceweek.com/three-years-in-dodd-frank-deadlines-missed-as-page-count-rises/article/303986/. As
of December 2014, 231 (58.04 percent) of the total 398 rules mandated by Dodd-Frank have been completed,
while 94 (23.62 percent) rulemaking requirements remain outstanding. Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Davis
Polk, http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

6.

See Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama—The Evolution of Broker-Dealer
Regulation: From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal Regulation, Litigation, and
Fiduciary Duty, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 1 (2010) (“It is no accident that the [1934 Securities
Exchange] Act was promulgated in the aftermath of the greatest economic catastrophe in U.S. history.”).
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One alleged regulatory gap that Dodd-Frank looked to reform is the standard of
care applied to broker-dealers7 in their dealings with customers.8 Currently, brokerdealers do not owe a fiduciary duty 9 to their customers.10 Rather, broker-dealers are
currently held to a lesser standard of care: the duty of fair dealing, which (similar to
a fiduciary standard) is a principles-based standard that provides certain guidelines
as to how broker-dealers should act in their everyday dealings with customers. From
this duty of fair dealing stems specific regulatory obligations.11 Despite the fact that
broker-dealers are governed by both a principles-based and rules-based approach to
regulation, the widespread abuses and unethical business practices exposed during
the financial crisis demonstrate that the current model regulating broker-dealers is
ineffective. Most commentators believe that the root of the ineffectiveness lies in the
“lesser” standard of care applied to broker-dealers—the duty of fair dealing.12 The
7.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), the primary legislation governing brokers and
dealers, defines “brokers” and “dealers” separately. However, because this note concentrates on brokerdealers as an entity, and because most rules under the Exchange Act do not distinguish between brokers
and dealers, this note uses the term “broker-dealer” unless there is a reason to distinguish between the
two roles. Note that a broker-dealer is both an agent and a principal. It is an agent when it acts as a
broker and effects securities transactions for the accounts of others for a fee, and a principal when it acts
as a dealer and buys and sells securities for its own account. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
§ 3(a)(4)(A), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2013)) (defining “broker”); id.
§ 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (defining “dealer”).

8.

See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); SEC, Study on Investment
Advisers and Broker-Dealers 1 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter SEC Staff Study], available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (noting that Dodd-Frank asked the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to evaluate whether there are any “legal or regulatory gaps,
shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail customers relating
to the standards of care for brokers, dealers, [and] investment advisers”).

9.

Generally, a fiduciary duty obligates one party to act in the best interest of another party, however the nature
and scope of the duty is amorphous. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879 (1988). “A fiduciary duty may arise either expressly or impliedly”
from a formal appointment or it may arise de facto from the specific relationship between the parties. John F.
Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, 84 Fla. B.J. 20, 22 (Mar. 2010). Unlike investment advisers
(discussed below), “broker-dealers are not categorically bound—by statute, regulation, or precedent—to a per
se rule imposing fiduciary obligations toward clients.” Angela A. Hung et al., Investor and Industry
Perspectives on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers 10 (2008) [hereinafter Rand Report].
This study, made by the Rand Corporation on request from the SEC, was intended primarily to provide the
SEC with information on the current business practices of broker-dealers and investment advisers, and how
(if at all) investors perceive or understand these differences. See Research Brief: Investment Advisers and BrokerDealers, Rand Corp. (2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9337/index1.html.

10.

See generally SEC Staff Study, supra note 8; Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 701, 719 (2010) [hereinafter Laby, Fiduciary Obligations] (“[B]rokers . . .
do not owe their customers fiduciary duties.”); 11 N.Y. Jur. 2d Brokers § 81 (“Absent agreement to the
contrary, a broker does not owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.”).

11.

See discussion infra Part II. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 51. Some commentators refer to this
duty only as the suitability obligation, but this note contends a more accurate portrayal of the brokerdealer obligations is the duty of fair dealing, within which there are specific suitability obligations.

12.

Andrew Clipper & Benjamin Poor, Broker-Dealers As Fiduciaries? How the SEC Staff’s
Study Could Raise the Bar for Investment Advice 2 (2012) (“Critics of the suitability standard
have argued that it reads like a minimum threshold—insisting that the investment be adequate for the
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solution then became to elevate the standard of care to a fiduciary standard, in hopes
that this would rein in Wall Street.13
In response to this widespread call for the implementation of a fiduciary standard,
Dodd-Frank granted rulemaking authority14 to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules to impose a new standard of care on brokerdealers.15 Specifically, the fiduciary duty described in Dodd-Frank would require
broker-dealers to act in the best interests of their clients without regard to the
financial interest of the broker-dealer, and to disclose any conflicts of interest—the
same standard investment advisers are currently held to under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).16
Prior to engaging in any rulemaking, however, Dodd-Frank required the SEC to
conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing legal and regulatory standards
of care for broker-dealers and the potential impact of applying a fiduciary standard of
care on broker-dealers, and to deliver the results of this study to Congress within six
months of Dodd-Frank’s enactment.17 Following this mandate, SEC staff released a
study in January 2011, making a preliminary recommendation that the SEC exercise its
rulemaking authority and apply a fiduciary standard of care to broker-dealers.18 This
study, however, cautioned that it did not necessarily reflect the views of the SEC or any
individual SEC commissioner.19 Indeed, in a jointly released statement, two (of the total
five) SEC commissioners expressed their strong disagreement with this preliminary
study, noting that it failed to “adequately justify its recommendation that the Commission
embark on fundamentally changing the regulatory regime for broker-dealers.”20
Nearly five years later, the SEC has yet to exercise its rulemaking authority under
Dodd-Frank and implement a fiduciary standard on broker-dealers. In March 2013,
however, the SEC took its first steps toward rulemaking and requested information
from the industry and public on the costs and benefits of imposing a fiduciary duty
investor, but that the quality of the recommendation stops short of the higher standard of care proscribed
by fiduciary relationships.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13.

E.g., Letter from Kevin R. Keller, Chief Exec. Officer, CFP Board, Lauren Schadle, Exec. Dir./CEO,
FPA, Geoffrey Brown, Chief Exec. Officer, NAPFA, to Joseph Dear, Chairman, SEC Investor
Advisory Comm. (Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-28/26528-42.pdf.

14.

As noted above, many Dodd-Frank provisions delegate rulemaking to federal agencies. One such
delegation is the imposition, if any, of a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers. Therefore, any reform imposed
on broker-dealers will come as a result of rulemaking by the SEC. See Mont, supra note 5.

15.

See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

16.

See id. § 913(g). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) is the primary source of
regulation of investment advisers (and, as discussed in Part II, such definition excludes broker-dealers)
and is administered by the SEC. See discussion infra Part II.

17.

See Dodd-Frank § 913.

18.

SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at ii.

19.

Id.

20. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Statement Regarding Study on Investment

Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch012211klctap.htm.
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on broker-dealers.21 The comment period ended in July 2013, 22 but the SEC has yet
to complete its anticipated cost-benefit analysis.
In November 2013, the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (IAC), a panel established
by Dodd-Frank to “represent the interests of small investors,” released a recommendation
that the SEC adopt a uniform fiduciary rule.23 The IAC did so in the hope of moving
the fiduciary duty issue “to the front burner,”24 however the SEC appears indifferent. The
SEC’s 2014 regulatory agenda, released after the IAC’s recommendation, slates the
fiduciary duty issue for “long-term action”25 and lists it as its fortieth priority out of fortythree items.26 Such indifference is due in part perhaps to the difficulties—and
impracticalities—associated with implementing such a standard on broker-dealers.27
Further, the five SEC commissioners still appear to be divided over the issue.
Chair Mary Jo White and Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar and Kara Stein seem
ready to implement a fiduciary standard, 28 however Commissioners Daniel M.
Gallagher and Michael Piwowar remain skeptical.29
21.

The information requested by the SEC includes: (1) characteristics of retail customers investing through
broker-dealers versus characteristics of those investing through investment advisers; (2) information
about the types of securities offered to retail customers; (3) information regarding the conf licts of
interest faced by both investment advisers and broker-dealers; and (4) information describing the extent
to which retail customers are confused about the regulatory status of the person from whom they receive
financial advice. See SEC, Request for Data and Other Information, Exchange Act Release No.
34-69013 (Mar. 1, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf.

22.

Id.

23.

Mark Schoeff, Jr., Advisory Panel Calls on SEC to Move Fiduciary Duty to Front Burner, InvestmentNews
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20131122/FREE/131129954/advisorypanel-calls-on-sec-to-move-fiduciary-duty-to-front-burner (“The panel comprises 21 members,
including financial industry officials, academicians, consumer advocates and state regulators.”).

24.

Id.

25.

Long-term action items have a lesser priority than proposed-rule or final-rule stage action items. Mark
Schoeff, Jr., SEC Puts Fiduciary Duty on 2014 Agenda as “Long-Term Action”, InvestmentNews (Dec. 2,
2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20131202/FREE/131209997/sec-putsfiduciary-duty-on-2014-agenda-as-long-term-action.

26. See SEC Agenda Rule List—Fall 2013, Office Info. & Regulatory Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/

do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RULE_LIST&currentPubId=201310&s
howStage=longterm&agencyCd=3235&Image58.x=11&Image58.y=9&Image58=Submit (last visited Apr.
10, 2015); SEC Agenda Rule List—Fall 2014, Office Info. & Regulatory Affairs, http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RULE_LIST&currentPub=
true&agencyCode=&showStage=active&agencyCd=3235 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

27.

See discussion infra Part III.

28. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC’s Mary Jo White’s Top Priority: Uniform Fiduciary Standard, InvestmentNews

(Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140221/free/140229975/secs-mary-jo-whitestop-priority-uniform-fiduciary-standard; Luis A. Aguilar, Statement in Support of Extending a
Fiduciary Duty to Broker-Dealers Who Provide Investment Advice (Mar. 11, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch051110laa.htm; Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Nat’l Soc. of Compliance Prof ’ls Nat’l Meeting (Oct. 23, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491556#.Uy9dF6hdUbY.

29. See Melanie Waddell, SEC’s Gallagher: Fiduciary Rule Likely Not Coming, ThinkAdvisor (Mar. 12,

2014), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2014/03/12/secs-gallagher-fiduciary-rule-likely-not-coming;
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This note argues that the ineffectiveness of the current regulatory system as applied
to broker-dealers is not the result of an absence of regulation, but rather stems from the
lack of adequate enforcement of existing rules and regulations. Following this
Introduction, Part II gives a brief overview of the existing regulatory regime, as applied
to broker-dealers, to give context to the discussion. Part III uses the infamous case
SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., wherein Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) was accused
of committing fraud in a complicated securities transaction30 —which is usually used as
an example of why a fiduciary standard is necessary—as a means for demonstrating
why imposing such a standard fails to cure problems inherent in broker-dealer firms.
Part IV discusses the problems with imposing a fiduciary standard on broker-dealers in
general. Part V provides a solution, which comes not from the legislature, but from a
change in the SEC’s current enforcement policy. Part VI concludes this note.
II.	Historical Overview of Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser
Fiduciary Duties

Currently, financial advisers are held to two standards of care: (1) the fiduciary
standard, which governs investment advisers; and (2) the duty of fair dealing, which
governs broker-dealers.31 These differing standards come from the fact that brokerdealers and investment advisers are governed by different bodies of law, and also
because each group plays a distinct role when providing advice to customers. 32
A. Standard Imposed on Investment Advisers

Investment advisers, considered fiduciaries, are regulated under the Advisers
Act, which takes a principles-based approach to regulation.33 Under the Advisers
Act, an investment adviser is defined as a person that receives compensation for
providing advice regarding securities as part of a regular business.34 If a person or

Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Piwowar Proposes Alternative to Broker Fiduciary Rules, Reuters (Sept. 30,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/30/sec-fiduciary-piwowar-idUSL2N0RV16V20140930.
30. 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
31.

SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 51.

32.

At the time the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Exchange Act were passed, brokerdealers merely bought and sold securities; they did not offer or provide investment advice to customers.
Therefore, broker-dealers were not seen as agents for their customers, as compared with investment
advisers, who were viewed as agents. See Allen, supra note 6, at 22; SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at i.

33.

The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry: Investment Advisers Act of 1940, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#invadvact1940 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

34. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 202(a)(11), 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2013)) (defining an investment adviser as “any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities”).
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firm meets the definition of investment adviser, then registration is required either
under federal or state law.35
Investment advisers are considered fiduciaries and, as such, are required to “act solely
with the client’s investment goals and interests in mind, free from any direct or indirect
conflicts of interest that would tempt the adviser to make recommendations that would
also benefit him or her.”36 While this duty is not specifically articulated in the Advisers
Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has construed the antifraud sections of the Advisers Act as
imposing such a standard on investment advisers for all dealings with clients.37 Further,
as part of its fiduciary duty, an investment adviser must make a full and fair disclosure of
all material facts, especially when the adviser’s interests may conflict with those of
customers.38 These fiduciary duties have been “categorically” upheld and apply to every
investment adviser, whether registered under the Advisers Act or not.39
In addition to this extensive fiduciary standard, investment advisers are also subject
to the “suitability”40 and “best execution”41 standards applicable to broker-dealers.42
35.

See id. §§ 203(l), 203(i), 203(m) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3). Section 203A, as amended
by Dodd-Frank, prohibits investment advisers with less than $100 million in assets under management to
register under the Advisers Act. Id. § 203A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a).

36. See Rand Report, supra note 9, at 13; Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, U.S. Sec. &

Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/advoverview.htm (noting that
the duty is “a fundamental obligation to act in the best interests of [the] clients and to provide investment
advice in [the] clients’ best interests. [Advisers] owe [their] clients a duty of undivided loyalty and utmost
good faith. [Advisers] should not engage in any activity in conflict with the interest of any client”).

37.

Section 206 contains the general antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act and makes it unlawful for
investment advisers to engage in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. that § 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment
advisers. 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). Even advisers regulated by the states are subject to the antifraud provisions
of the Advisers Act and, therefore, are held to this federal fiduciary standard. See Advisers Act § 206.

38. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–92 (noting investment advisers must “eliminate, or at least expose, all

conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render
advice which was not disinterested”); Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment advisers to
register with the SEC and state securities regulators. The General Instructions for Part 2 of Form ADV
states: “Under federal and state law, [advisers] are a fiduciary and must make full disclosure to [] clients of
all material facts relating to the advisory relationship. As a fiduciary, [advisers] also must seek to avoid
conflicts of interest with [] clients, and, at a minimum, make full disclosure of all material conflicts of
interest between [themselves and their] clients that could affect the advisory relationship.” Form ADV:
Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part2.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (emphasis omitted).

39.

S. Rep. No. 86-1760 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3502, 3509 (specifying that the antifraud
provisions in § 206 apply to registered and unregistered investment advisers); see also Rand Report,
supra note 9, at 13.

40. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 27–28.
41.

See Advisers Act § 206(3); In re Portfolio Advisory Serv., LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 2038, 77 SEC
Docket 2759, 2002 WL 1343823, at *2 (June 20, 2002) (“An investment adviser’s fiduciary duty
includes the requirement to seek best execution of client securities transactions.”).

42.

See Rand Report, supra note 9, at 13. For a discussion on suitability and best execution, see infra pp.
570–71.
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Though broker-dealers (when acting in a brokerage capacity) give advice to
customers with respect to securities transactions, and therefore meet the broad43
definition of an investment adviser, the Advisers Act excludes broker-dealers from
regulation—and hence, from any fiduciary duty obligation—provided the brokerdealer’s investment advice is “solely incidental” to brokerage services and such
broker-dealer does not receive “special compensation”44 for such advice.45
Broker-dealers are excluded from the Adviser’s Act because historically brokerdealers were viewed less like advisers—as the name suggests—and more as agents
facilitating client transactions.46 In contrast, investment advisers provide continual
investment advice as part of their regular business to less-knowledgeable retail
customers.47 The differences with respect to the length of the relationship, the types
of transactions involved, and the sophistication of the parties resulted in (and justify)
the two different standards for these two classes of financial advisers.48
B. Standard Imposed on Broker-Dealers

In contrast to the principles-based approach to regulation, broker-dealer conduct
is largely regulated via a rules-based approach.49 Broker-dealers are regulated under a
myriad of authorities, including the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),50 the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities
43.

See SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that the SEC interprets the definition of investment
advisers “broadly”).

44. A fee-based account (i.e., an account that charges an asset-based or fixed fee) is considered “special

compensation.” Commission-based accounts, like those generally used by broker-dealers, are not
considered advisory. See Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration: Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm [hereinafter SEC
Guide to Broker-Dealers].

45.

Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). For a good critique of this exemption, see Laby,
Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 10.

46. Allen, supra note 6, at 24.
47.

Id.

48. See, e.g., Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P.2d 658, 661 (Ariz. 1966) (“[T]he broker’s duties, unlike those

of an investment adviser . . . are only to fulfill the mechanical, ministerial requirements of the purchase
or sale of the security . . . .”).

49. Anita I. Anand, Rules v. Principles as Approaches to Financial Market Regulation, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 111,

112 (2009).

50. The Exchange Act requires most broker-dealers, whether individuals or entities, to register with the SEC.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 15(a)(1), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(a)(1)) (requiring registration of most broker-dealers by prohibiting the use by any broker or dealer of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce
or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (unless an exemption applies) unless such broker
or dealer is registered with the SEC). The Exchange Act regulates securities transactions in the secondary
market. With its main goal of investor protection, the Exchange Act sets out a mandatory disclosure
process, provides for direct regulation of the markets in which securities are sold, and regulates participants
in those markets, including broker-dealers. See generally id. § 15. Section 4 of the Exchange Act established
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Act”),51 the SEC rules promulgated thereunder, and specific self-regulatory organization
(SRO) rules52—usually those of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).53
Additionally, most broker-dealers are required to register with the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation,54 and may also be subject to state regulation.55
As discussed above, while broker-dealers are not directly subjected to a fiduciary
standard, they are subject to the duty of fair dealing, which essentially requires
broker-dealers to deal fairly with their customers and in accordance with industry
standards.56 This duty stems from the “shingle theory,” and the idea that by being in
the securities business and soliciting customers (by hanging out a “shingle”), brokerdealers make an implied promise of fair dealing.57 This concept of fair dealing was
first introduced by the SEC in the 1930s, applied under the antifraud provisions of

the SEC, the primary agency that both oversees the regulatory markets and directly enforces the provisions
of both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. Id. § 4(a)
51.

Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa). The
Securities Act, passed after the 1929 stock market crash, “was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect
investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).

52.

The securities world puts a lot of emphasis on self-regulation, due to the long-standing belief that
industry participants are better equipped to respond to regulatory problems given their expertise and
knowledge of the securities industry. As a result, while broker-dealers are subject to SEC oversight, selfregulatory organizations (SRO) are given initial regulatory authority to create and enforce conduct rules
and standards governing the securities and brokerage industry. See Allen, supra note 6, at 20. All brokerdealers are required to become members of at least one SRO. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)); see also Robert L.D. Colby et al., Fundamentals of BrokerDealer Regulation § 2:1.2 (2010).

53.

Broker-dealers are primarily regulated under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
but the SEC retains oversight authority. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at iv–v. FINRA was formed
in 2007 by a consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the member
regulation, enforcement, and arbitration operations of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Press
Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD & NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.—FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/
NewsReleases/2007/p036329.

54. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. 78aaa–78lll); Colby et al., supra note 52, § 2:1.3. The Securities Investor Protection Act
(SIPA), considered an amendment to the Exchange Act, created the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), which is an independent, government-sponsored membership corporation to
which all persons registered as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act must belong. SIPC is essentially
an insurance scheme for broker-dealer customers and provides protection in the event of a broker-dealer
bankruptcy. SIPC Mission, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/sipc-mission
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

55.

See SEC Guide to Broker-Dealers, supra note 44.

56. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 51.
57.

Id. at 51; Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596–97 (2d Cir. 1969).

569

KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD

N

the Exchange Act and the Securities Act,58 and was later affirmed by the courts.59
The duty of fair dealing acts as a failsafe, protecting investors who may not meet the
required elements for fraud, but are still harmed when they entrust their funds to
broker-dealers. This residual protection was recently affirmed in a U.S. Supreme
Court decision in which the Court held that a client need only prove violations of
professional duties of fair dealing, rather than intentional misstatements or an intent
to deceive.60 Similarly, the duty of fair dealing is also expressed in FINRA Rule
2010, requiring brokers to adhere to “high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade.”61
The duty of fair dealing also includes specific regulatory requirements, including
suitability, the duty of best execution, and disclosure obligations.
The suitability obligation—applied also under the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, SEC rules promulgated thereunder, and specific
SRO rules—generally requires broker-dealers to look to a customer’s specific financial
needs and objectives when making a recommendation.62 Determining whether a
broker-dealer has made a suitable recommendation is a fact-and-circumstance-based
analysis, depending on the nature of the product, the type of transaction, and the
parties involved.63 A suitability violation has different mens rea requirements depending
on the rule or section under which the suit was brought.64
58. The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Securities Act generally prohibit broker-dealers from

engaging in fraud, manipulation, and insider trading activities. See Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b),
48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) (the principal statutory weapon against fraud, which
prohibits the use of any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” and creates liability for any misstatement or
omission of a material fact); id. § 9(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i) (punishing market
manipulation); id. § 15(c)(7) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (punishing false and misleading
statements); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 17, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q)
(prohibiting fraud or manipulation in the offer or sale of securities).

59.

See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Duker & Duker, Exchange Act
Release No. 2350, 1939 WL 36426, at *3 (Dec. 19, 1939) (“Inherent in the relationship between a dealer
and his customer is . . . that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with the standards
of the profession.”).

60. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 814, 819 (2002) (holding that a misstatement or omission was not

required under § 10(b) and Rule 10-b(5) and that § 10(b) should be read flexibly, rather than restrictively).

61.

FINRA Manual: Rule 2010, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., available at http://finra.complinet.
com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

62. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 61; FINRA Manual: Rule 2111, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.

[hereinafter FINR A Rule 2111], available at http://f inra.complinet.com/en/display/display.
html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (superseding the old suitability rule
under NASD IM-2310-3).

63. For example, FINRA Rule 2111 requires a broker to have a reasonable belief that: (1) a given securities

transaction or strategy is appropriate for the broker to recommend to someone; (2) the transaction or
strategy is appropriate for the broker to recommend to the particular customer based on the customer’s
investment profile; and (3) a series of transactions is not excessive or otherwise unsuitable. FINRA
Rule 2111, supra note 62.

64. If brought under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act or SEC Rule 10b-5, the broker’s unsuitable recommendation

must be a misrepresentation made with scienter. Proving scienter requires a showing of intent to deceive,
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The “best execution” rule requires broker-dealers to obtain the best price
reasonably possible under the circumstances for their customers.65 This duty applies
regardless of whether the broker-dealer is acting as an agent or the principal.66 If
applied under the antifraud rules, a broker-dealer may violate Exchange Act § 10b
and SEC Rule 10b-5 when it knowingly or recklessly sells a security to a customer at
a price that has no reasonable relationship to the prevailing market price.67 The
FINRA rule governing best execution, in contrast, does not require such scienter
and, instead, lays out specific factors for determining reasonableness for a given
transaction.68
Finally, broker-dealers are subject to mandatory disclosure obligations.69 The
extent of the disclosure obligation generally depends on the scope of the brokerdealer’s relationship with the customer.70 Notably, the rules governing broker-dealers
do not actually prohibit such conflicts of interest; they merely obligate broker-dealers

manipulate, or defraud. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that scienter is “conduct that is at
the least . . . highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the
defendant must have been aware of it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, claims under §
17(a) of the Securities Act may be based on negligent conduct and do not require proof of scienter. E.g.,
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1980). Similarly, proving unsuitability under FINRA does not
require a showing of scienter. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 61.
65.

The best execution standard stems from common law agency principles. This standard was incorporated
in SRO rules and through judicial and SEC enforcement actions. E.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998).

66. See FINRA Manual: Rule 5310(a)(2), Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., available at http://finra.

complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
Recall that a broker-dealer can be both, and simultaneously, agent and principal, depending on the
nature of the deal involved. See Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3(a)(4)(A), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2013)) (defining “broker”); id. § 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)
(2014) (defining “dealer”).

67.

SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 70; Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a right of action for failing to disclose price markups exists under SEC Rule 10b-5
against broker-dealers that charged excessive markups without proper disclosure).

68. Factors considered in determining “reasonable diligence” include: (1) the character of the market for the

security; (2) the size and type of transaction; (3) the number of markets checked; (4) accessibility of the
quotation; and (5) the terms and conditions of the order that resulted in the transaction. FINRA
Manual: Rule 5310, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). FINRA Rule 5310
replaced the NASD Rule 2320 rule for best execution.

69. See Exchange Act §10(b). Under Rule 10b-10 the broker-dealer must disclose in what capacity it is

making the transaction and whether “the broker or dealer is acting as agent for such customer, as agent
for some other person, as agent for both such customer and some other person, or as a principal for its
own account; and if the broker or dealer is acting as principal, whether it is a market maker in the
security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2) (2014).

70. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 55.
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to acknowledge them.71 Broker-dealers must make these disclosures at or prior to the
completion of a transaction.72
Despite this extensive regulation covering broker-dealer conduct, the recession of
2008, and the numerous frauds exposed in its aftermath, demonstrate that the
current regulatory system must be re-examined. One example of a particularly
egregious business practice involved Goldman73 and its role in the infamous deal
known as ABACUS 2007-AC1 SPV (ABACUS),74 an investment vehicle created by
Goldman that actively misled its customers to the tune of $1 billion dollars.75
III.	Goldman and ABACUS

ABACUS represented not only a “symbol[] of the recent financial fiasco,”76 but
also became the perfect vehicle for those advocating for a fiduciary standard for
broker-dealers.77 As one commentator noted:
71.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2).

72. See id. As seen in SEC v. Tourre, and discussed in Part III.B, infra, such failure to disclose can lead to

SEC prosecution and civil penalties. 950 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013). Fabrice Tourre, for
his part, was ordered to pay roughly $825,000 after he was found liable for defrauding investors. Nate
Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Big Fine Imposed on Ex-Goldman Trader Tourre in SEC Case, Reuters
(Mar. 12, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-goldmansachs-sec-tourreidUSBREA2B11220140312.

73. Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) is a prominent global investment banking and securities firm.

Among other things, Goldman is known for its advisory services and proprietary trading. See Who We
Are, Goldman Sachs, http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/index.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2015).

74.

The ABACUS investment vehicle discussed in this note, which was ultimately the subject of the SEC
case against Goldman, was just one of the numerous ABACUS deals that Goldman issued from 2005
through 2008. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/24trading.html.

75. E.g., Dan Wilchins et al., Factbox: How Goldman’s ABACUS Deal Worked, Reuters (Apr. 16, 2010, 4:30 PM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/16/us-goldmansachs-abacus-factbox-idUSTRE63F5CZ20100416
[hereinafter Factbox: The ABACUS Deal].

76. Michele Cea, The Settlement Between the SEC and Goldman Sachs of July 2010 and the

Following Misplaced Proposal of Imposing a Fiduciary Duty on Broker-Dealers 3 (2011)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923700
(follow “Download This Paper” hyperlink).

77.

For example, the chairman for the Committee for the Fiduciary Standard, Knut A. Rostad, noted:
[ABACUS] highlights the wide gap and opposing roles of a broker who is permitted in
law to further his and his firm’s interests at the expense of customers’, and a fiduciary
who is required in law to put his clients’ interests first. This is at the core of why the
fiduciary standard is important.

Kate McBride, Goldman Sachs, Suitability and the Fiduciary Standard, ThinkAdvisor (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://w w w.thinkadvisor.com/2010/04/21/goldman-sachs-suitability-and-the-f iduciary-standa
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Committee for the Fiduciary Standard was formed in June
2009 by a group of investment professionals and fiduciary experts to advocate for a fiduciary standard
for all those who give investment and financial advice. Committee Initiatives, The Committee
for the Fiduciary Standard, http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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First, the subject stands out. It involves the “untouchable” Goldman, the world’s
major investment banking player, which has often been blamed for its alleged
reckless practices, but it regularly managed not to be held accountable. . . .
Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman[] employee directly involved in the case, has a
remarkable impact on public opinion . . . [and] he is featured, justly or not, as
the identification of Wall Street’s greed.78 Second, [collateralized debt
obligation],79 the financial tool employed in the transaction, is deemed as one of
those instruments that unfolded the subprime mortgage cancer worldwide.80
Finally, this transaction acquires historical traits due to the considerable sum of
money arranged.81

Before engaging in a discussion of whether the ABACUS deal resulted from a lack
of a fiduciary duty, some background on the deal is necessary to determine exactly
what, if anything, Goldman did wrong.

78. See also Raymond & Stempel, supra note 72 (“Tourre became a symbol of the financial meltdown . . . .”).
79. A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a type of security whose value and payments are derived from

a portfolio of underlying fixed-income assets, such as mortgages, bonds, and loans, which serve as the
collateral for the CDO. Because a portfolio is made up of multiple debt obligations, and such obligations
vary substantially in risk, the cash flows from CDOs are split into different risk classes (“tranches”).
Investors in a CDO choose the tranche that meets their particular needs, and cash flows from these
tranches—comprised of the interest and principal payments of the underlying assets—are distributed to
the investors in order of seniority based on a set of pre-specified rules. See Goldman Sachs, ABACUS
2007-AC1, at 11 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/ABACUS.
pdf. This senior/subordinate structure serves as a sort of internal credit enhancement, with the senior
tranche receiving investment grade bonds even though the underlying collateral is subprime debt,
because the senior tranche is not actually backed by the underlying collateral but, rather, is backed by
the set of rules governing the cash flow from the collateral. However, if the underlying asset in the pool
defaults (i.e., when the homeowners default on their mortgages), then losses are allocated from the
bottom up (from the junior to the most senior), and senior classes remain unaffected unless the losses
exceed the subordinated tranches. This senior/subordinate structure appeared to be risk free. Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, at xxiv (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Financial Crisis Report], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.
pdf. However, the recent plummeting of the U.S. real estate market and the subsequent financial crisis
proved that this appearance was wrong. Even with an internal credit enhancement structure in place,
when every mortgagor stops making interest and/or principal payments—as to be expected in a portfolio
comprised of mostly subprime mortgages—the losses on these assets become enormous, affecting the
entire CDO. E.g., Mark J.P. Anson et al., CAIA Level I: An Introduction to Core Topics in
Alternative Investments 696 (2d ed. 2012); Douglas J. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt
Obligations: Structures and Analysis 122–24 (2d ed. 2006).

80. See Warren Buffet on Derivatives, Montgomery Inv. Tech., Inc., available at http://www.fintools.com/

docs/Warren%20Buffet%20on%20Derivatives.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (excerpted from
Berkshire Hathaway annual report for 2002, calling derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction,
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal”).

81.

Cea, supra note 76, at 3 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. Background: The Creation and Structuring of ABACUS

In simple terms, the story of Goldman and ABACUS began in late 2006, near
the end of the real estate bubble,82 when mortgage securities and their underlying
mortgages were some of the most attractive investments—mainly because they were
seen as relatively safe, 83 and also because they had the possibility of returning
extremely high yields.84 During this time, hedge fund president John Paulson,85 who
was “virtually alone in predicting the fallout from the housing bubble,”86 approached
Goldman seeking to short87 the housing market by betting against future prospects
of mortgage-backed securities.88 In response, Goldman structured a transaction
allowing Paulson to take a short position on a portfolio of residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS).89 The result was ABACUS, a synthetic collateralized

82. Housing prices reached their peaked in 2006. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing

Bubble and the Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-technical Paper, 8 J. Bus. Inquiry 120, 126 (2009), available
at http://www.uvu.edu/woodbury/docs/summaryoftheprimarycauseofthehousingbubble.pdf. See
generally id. for an overview of the primary causes of the housing bubble.

83. Financial Crisis Report, supra note 79, at 100 (noting that mortgage-backed securities were

“supposed to be among the safest investments”); id. at xxiv (“It appeared to financial institutions,
investors, and regulators alike that[,] [with respect to CDOs,] risk had been conquered: the investors
held highly rated securities they thought were sure to perform; the banks thought they had taken the
riskiest loans off their books; and regulators saw firms making profits and borrowing costs reduced.”).

84. In 2006, approximately $560 billion of CDOs were sold. Gregory Zuckerman, The Greatest

Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of How John Paulson Defied Wall Street and
Made Financial History 172 (2009) (“CDO investments were an instant hit because they had juicy
returns . . . .”).

85. John Paulson is the president of Paulson & Co., Inc., a hedge fund founded in 1994. While today

Paulson is one of the most well-known hedge fund managers in the industry, in 2006 he was “a Wall
Street outsider . . . [considered by many to be] a third-rate hedge fund guy who didn’t know what he was
talking about.” Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine 106 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

86. Katya Wachtel, John Paulson: The Man Who Turned Contrarian Bets Into Billions, Business Insider

(May 29, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/john-paulson-greatest-hedge-fundinvestor-contrarian-2011-5.

87.

The short-selling investor shorts a stock when he or she anticipates a decrease in stock price. If the price
drops, the investor can buy back the stock at a lower price, making a profit—or “spread”—on the
difference. If the stock rises in price, the investor must buy the stock back at the higher price, and hence
loses money on the deal. See Financial Crisis Report, supra note 79, at 543.

88. Complaint at 12, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.

11-CV-7387), 2011 WL 4965843.

89. Levin-Coburn Report, supra note 1, at 396. Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) are a

specific type of asset-backed securities in which the underlying assets are residential mortgages. RMBS
represent groups of mortgages that are pooled together to create the securities, which securities are then
sold to investors who receive payments as the homeowners make principal and interest payments on the
underlying mortgages. E.g., Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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debt obligation (CDO),90 whose value derived from the value of the underlying
securities—in this case, RMBS.91
The structuring of a CDO is a complicated process that generally involves four
major players: (1) securities firms, who approve the selection of collateral, structure
the underlying assets into tranches, and ultimately sell these assets as securities to
investors; (2) CDO managers, who select the collateral and actually manage the
CDO portfolio; (3) rating agencies, who assess the tranches in the CDO and assign
them credit ratings; and (4) investors.
A CDO, like all derivatives, is zero-sum, meaning it requires investors on both
sides of the deal—i.e., those taking a long position and those taking a short position.92
The investors in a synthetic CDO include: (1) “funded” long investors that pay cash
to purchase actual securities issued by the CDO and receive interest if the reference
securities perform, but lose their investment if the reference securities default; (2)
“unfunded” long investors (the most senior in the payment system) that enter into
swaps with the CDO, making money if the reference securities perform, but have to
pay if the reference securities deteriorate beyond a certain point and the CDO does
not have sufficient funds to pay the short investors; and (3) short investors that buy
credit default swaps93 on the reference securities, pay the premiums that the unfunded
investors might receive if the underlying assets appreciate in value, and ultimately
make money if the securities fail.94
As the securities firm involved in the deal, Goldman was responsible for
overseeing the selection of collateral, structuring the deal, and connecting and
90. A synthetic CDO, unlike a traditional CDO, does not own the underlying assets that comprise its

portfolio. Rather, a synthetic CDO invests indirectly in assets using credit default swaps (CDS) or other
derivatives. See Levin-Coburn Report, supra note 1, at 51. As such, a synthetic CDO is a complex
derivative sometimes described as the bet on the performance of another mortgage (or other fixed
assets), rather than a real mortgage security. See Financial Crisis Report, supra note 79, at xxiv. The
value and payment stream of a synthetic CDO derives not from cash assets, like mortgages (as would be
the case in a regular CDO), but from premiums paying for credit default swap “insurance” on the
possibility that a defined set of “reference” securities will default. The insurance-buying counterparties
may own the reference securities as a way of managing the risk of their default, or may be speculators
calculating that the securities will default. Id. at 142. As such, synthetic CDOs have been criticized as a
way of hiding short position bets against subprime mortgages from unsuspecting triple-A-seeking
investors, and contributing to the 2007–2008 financial crisis by amplifying the subprime mortgage
housing bubble. Id. at xvi (“The losses were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic securities.”).

91.

See Factbox: The Abacus Deal, supra note 75.

92.

See Douglas J. Lucas et al., Developments in Collateralized Debt Obligations: New
Products and Insights 23 (2007) (“Distribution of collateral cash flow amongst tranches in a CDO
is a zero-sum game.”).

93.

A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative contract in which a protection buyer makes periodic premium
payments and the protection seller makes a contingent payment if a reference obligation experiences a
credit event, acting as a form of “insurance” to the buyer. In addition to hedging default risk, CDSs can
be used as a way to speculate on credit events for the buyer. See Top 10 Financial Crisis Buzzwords: Credit
Default Swap, Time Mag., available at http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1847213_1847216_1847180,00.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

94. Financial Crisis Report, supra note 79, at 142.
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securing the long investors on the other side of the deal, i.e., the investors that would
only make money if the underlying assets appreciated in value.95 Recall that Paulson’s
firm was already the short investor for this deal. The long investors of import that
Goldman solicited in ABACUS were foreign banks IKB Deutsche Industriebank
AG (IKB) and ABN Amro Group (ABN).
Goldman knew that IKB would be interested in the long position in this deal,
but only if an outsider selected the underlying mortgages.96 As a result, Goldman
brought in ACA Management LLC (ACA), an independent asset manager, to act as
the CDO manager and select the securities for the underlying portfolio.97 However,
Goldman also allowed Paulson to select the underlying securities for the reference
portfolio, despite the fact that Paulson was looking to short these RMBSs, and
therefore had incentive to choose risky (“subprime”) mortgages for the portfolio.98
Ultimately, Paulson proposed forty-nine out of the final ninety assets used in the
ABACUS reference portfolio,99 the majority of which were subprime.100
Goldman ultimately put together ABACUS, an investment vehicle designed to
help IKB, ABN, and Paulson get the exposure they wanted. However, Goldman failed
to mention in its marketing materials Paulson’s role in selecting the underlying
securities, even though IKB specifically asked for an independent asset manager to
select the securities, and even though Paulson was far from independent.101 Ultimately,
IKB invested $150 million in the subprime bonds as the “funded” long investor; ABN,
the “unfunded” long investor, invested $909 million, buying protection on its exposure
from ACA Financial Guaranty Corp, the parent corporation of ACA.102
95. Steven M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in

Investment Banking, 37 J. Corp. L. 529, 535 (2012).

96. Factbox: The Abacus Deal, supra note 75.
97.

Goldman Sachs, supra note 79.

98. See Levin-Coburn Report, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that ABACUS was “the first and only Abacus

transaction in which Goldman allowed a third party [(Paulson)] to essentially ‘rent’ its CDO structure
and play a direct, principal role in the selection of the assets”).

99. Id. As noted supra note 90, because a synthetic CDO contract is not actually tied to the underlying

securities, but instead references them, the portfolio is called a “reference portfolio.” See Goldman
Sachs, ABACUS 2007-AC1, at 16–17 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/
avellane/ABACUS.pdf.

100. Levin-Coburn Report, supra note 1, at 396. Subprime borrowers are considered to be the riskiest class

of credit and are characterized by high debt-to-income ratios, low credit scores, and limited net worth.
Generally, such borrowers do not qualify for conventional financing, but in the years leading up to the
financial crisis, subprime borrowers were able to achieve financing relatively easily. As a result, demand
for homes skyrocketed and housing prices began to artificially inflate, deviating from their true value
and resulting in a bubble. See Financial Crisis Report, supra note 79; see also Steve Denning, Lest We
Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, Forbes (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/.

101. See Complaint at 2, SEC v. Tourre, 4 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 10-CV-3229), 2010 WL

1508202, at ¶ 2 (calling Tourre’s interests “directly adverse” to the long investors).

102. Factbox: The ABACUS Deal, supra note 75. When ABACUS was downgraded, because ABN Amro

Group (ABN) had bought protection on the deal from ACA Management LLC (ACA)—i.e., ABN
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Eventually, Paulson’s bet against ABACUS—and the housing market—paid off.
By January 2008, at the end of the housing bubble, 99 percent of the underlying
mortgage bonds in ABACUS experienced a downgrade as subprime borrowers began
defaulting on their loans.103 The long investors in ABACUS lost more than $1
billion, while Paulson’s firm, with its opposite short position, profited by roughly the
same amount.104 For its part, Goldman lost approximately $100 million, which was
partially offset by the $15 million structuring fee it received from Paulson for creating
and marketing ABACUS.105
B. The SEC’s Complaint and Its Aftermath

In April of 2010, the SEC filed suit against Goldman and Tourre for their role in
ABACUS.106 The SEC’s complaint accused Goldman and Tourre of misleading the
long investors (specifically, IKB) in ABACUS by failing to disclose that Paulson helped
choose, and intended to bet against, the mortgage securities underlying ABACUS.107
Specifically, the complaint charged Goldman and Tourre with violations of § 17(a) of
the Securities Act,108 § 10(b) of the Exchange Act,109 and SEC Rule 10-b5.110
Though the SEC’s complaint on its face asserted a formal violation of the
antifraud rules as its basis for a cause of action, the complaint and subsequent
hearings concentrated on the relationship between the parties involved and the
entered into a CDS with ACA—ACA was ultimately responsible for paying roughly $900 million to
Goldman to “unwind” the deal. Most of that money went to Paulson, as the short investor. Id.
103. The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Connection with the Structuring and Marketing of a

Synthetic CDO, SEC Litigation Release No. 21489 (Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Litigation
Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm; see Serena Ng, AIG,
Goldman Unwind Soured Trades, Wall St. J. (Apr. 12, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304846504575177953123007536.

104. SEC Litigation Release, supra note 103. ABACUS was not the only instance of Paulson & Co. profiting

from its shorts against the housing market. In fact, Paulson & Co. ultimately made nearly $4 billion in
2007 from shorting the housing market. Robert Lenzner, Here’s How John Paulson Made $5 Billion Last
Year, Forbes (Jan. 29, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2011/01/29/hereshow-john-paulson-made-5-billion-last-year/.

105. See Factbox: The ABACUS Deal, supra note 75.
106. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring

and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-59.htm.

107. See id.
108. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act prohibits any person from obtaining money or property by means of

any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact. Securities Act of 1933,
ch. 38, tit. I, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2013)). As discussed
above, violations of § 17(a) do not require proof of scienter and may be based on proof of negligence. See
discussion supra Part II.B.

109. To prove Goldman violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, the SEC would

have to prove that Goldman’s actions constituted a misrepresentation or a material omission made with
scienter. SEC Staff Study, supra note 8, at 61.

110. See Press Release, supra note 106.
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responsibilities that Goldman owed to its customers, therefore looking more like a
gap-filling, fiduciary-duty analysis rather than an application of a rules-based
antifraud analysis.111 Goldman distinguished its transactional role in ABACUS as
that of a market maker112 rather than an adviser: “As a market maker, we are making
buying and selling a thousand times a minute, probably. . . . Advising is where people
are coming to us for advice—people are asking us our opinion, where we have an
obligation and duty.”113
C. The Settlement

On July 14, 2010—mere hours after the Senate confirmed Dodd-Frank114 and
only three months after the SEC filed its complaint against Goldman—the SEC
and Goldman115 reached a settlement where Goldman agreed to pay a fine of $550
million.116 The SEC called the settlement “a stark lesson to Wall Street firms that no
product is too complex, and no investor is too sophisticated, to avoid a heavy price if
a firm violates the fundamental principles of honest treatment and fair dealing.”117
111. See id.; R.E. Heubel, Senate Hearing: Lloyd Blankfein vs. Sen. Levin; Goldman Sachs, YouTube (Apr. 27,

2010), available at http://youtu.be/oOpFbjHcxF0?t=14s (“There is such a fundamental conf lict of
interest . . . when Goldman is selling securities, [] particularly when its own people believe they are bad
items, . . . [and then] to go out and sell these securities, . . . is a fundamental conflict of interest and
raises a real ethical issue.”).

112. A market maker maintains an orderly market and ensures liquidity by matching buyers and sellers of a

security. If no sellers or buyers exist, the firm will buy or sell from its own portfolio. E.g., Blaine Aikin,
When Does Market Making Become Market Manipulation?, Forbes (Apr. 30, 2010, 5:13 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2010/04/30/when-does-market-making-become-marketmanipulation/. In its marketing materials, Goldman describes itself as a firm that “bring[s] together
people, capital and ideas.” Goldman Sachs, http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/events/2013/market_
structure/goldmansachs.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

113. Cyrus Sanati, Debate Flares on Goldman’s Role as Market Maker, N.Y. Times (May 4, 2010, 6:14 PM),

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/debate-f lares-on-goldmans-role-as-market-maker/ (internal
quotation marks omitted).

114. Francesco Guerrera et al., Goldman Sachs Settles with SEC, Fin. Times, (July 16, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4bd43894-904c-11df-ad26-00144feab49a.html#axzz2lRHM1Uaf.

115. While the SEC settled with Goldman, the case against Tourre went to trial. In August 2013, he was

found liable on six of seven counts of securities fraud violations by a Manhattan federal jury. SEC v.
Tourre, 950 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Tourre refused to settle with the SEC, “maintaining that
he had done nothing wrong.” Tim Mullaney, Ex-Goldman Trader ‘Fabulous Fab’ Loses Fraud Case, USA
Today (Aug. 1, 2013, 9:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/01/goldmantrader-fabrice-tourre-reaction/2609717/. Tourre’s defense rested in part on his belief that he should have
been shielded from personal responsibility because he told his bosses about the deal. Shortly before the
verdict in August 2013 was announced, Tourre told the Wall Street Journal, “I was a big team player. If
there was something wrong with this transaction, wouldn’t people have told me?” Justin Baer, Tourre
Interviews: Case Will ‘Stay with Me Forever’, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578639880516729260.

116. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229,

2010 WL 2779309 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011).

117. Guerrera et al., supra note 114 (quoting Robert Khuzami, then-director of the SEC’s enforcement

division).
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While the SEC touted this settlement as a win, the financial world and
blogosphere “almost universally” proclaimed Goldman the true victor.118 In reality,
the settlement was nothing but a slap on the wrist for Goldman. While a $550
million fine was, at the time, the biggest penalty levied on a Wall Street bank,119 to
Goldman, the fine was relatively nominal, amounting to roughly 4 percent (or a
week’s worth of trading revenues) of the roughly $13 billion in profits Goldman
earned during the year leading up to the settlement.120 Likewise, the settlement
amount was well below the $1 billion originally alleged in the complaint.121 Finally,
the settlement merely required Goldman to admit that its marketing materials for
ABACUS were “incomplete,” rather than forcing Goldman to admit to any real
wrongdoing:
[T]he marketing materials for the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction contained
incomplete information. In particular, it was a mistake for the Goldman
marketing materials to state that the reference portfolio was “selected by”
ACA Management LLC without disclosing the role of Paulson & Co. Inc. in
the portfolio selection process and that Paulson’s economic interests were
adverse to CDO investors.122

Immediately following the settlement, Goldman’s shares jumped 4.4 percent,
resulting in a near $3 billion increase in market capitalization for the firm,123 and were
up an additional 5 percent after hours, adding far more to the firm’s market value than
the amount it paid in the settlement.124 As one commentator noted after the settlement
announcement, “Goldman has, effectively, bought its reputation back.”125
118. Ben White, Boehner Immediately Calls for Repeal of Some Dodd-Frank Provisions—Timing of SEC

Settlement Makes Goldman a Winner, Politico (July 16, 2010, 4:59 AM), http://www.politico.com/
morningmoney/0710/morningmoney190.html.

119. Id.; On November 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice set a new record for the largest penalty,

settling with JPMorgan Chase & Co. for a record $13 billion in connection with the company’s role in
the sale of mortgage securities to investors. Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan’s Settlement: A Win for
Communities Hit Hard by Housing Crisis, Wash. Post (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
c o m / bu s i ne s s /e c onomy/ jpmor g a n-f i n a l i z e s-13 -bi l l ion- s e t t l e me nt-w it h-u s- ov e r-to x icmortgages/2013/11/19/a8863156-50aa-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1_story.html.

120. Guerrera et al., supra note 114; White, supra note 118 (noting that a $550 million fine was “big but

ultimately a footnote for a company that made $13.39 billion” in the previous year); Julianne Pepitone,
Goldman Settles with SEC for $550 Million, CNN Money (July 16, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://money.cnn.
com/2010/07/15/news/companies/SEC_goldman/.

121. Guerrera et al., supra note 114.
122. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle

SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-123.htm (original font in italics).

123. Guerrera et al., supra note 114; Tunku Varadarajan, Can You Hear Goldman Laughing?, Daily Beast

(July 15, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/07/16/goldman-sachs-pays-small-secfine-and-nothing-else.html.

124. Sewell Chan & Louise Story, Goldman Pays $550 Million to Settle Fraud Case, N.Y. Times (July 15,

2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16goldman.html.

125. Varadarajan, supra note 123.
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IV.	Problems With Implementing a Fiduciary Standard

Cases like Goldman prove that the unfettered, profit-maximizing culture of firms
clearly has an impact on customer protection.126 However, implementing a fiduciary
standard on broker-dealers is not the solution. While the federal securities acts were
passed with an aim toward customer protection, they were also passed with the
additional goal of ensuring the “least possible interference” with the finance markets.127
Implementing a fiduciary standard elevates customer protection unnecessarily at the
expense of market efficiency and ignores other viable solutions.
While it is true that Goldman was not held to a fiduciary standard during the
ABACUS deal, Goldman was held to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act,
Exchange Act, and specific SRO rules governing customer protection. Though the
SEC settled with Goldman and, hence, the issue of whether Goldman’s actions were
truly fraudulent was never litigated, it seems clear that a good case could have been
made against Goldman for violating the antifraud rules. This hypothesis is bolstered
by the fact that in August 2013, Tourre (the other named defendant in Goldman) was
found guilty of six of seven counts of securities fraud violations for his role in
ABACUS.128
Further, implementing a fiduciary standard on broker-dealers would have an
adverse effect on the market in several ways. First, requiring broker-dealers to act in
the best interests of all of their customers would make it harder for firms, if not
impossible, to act as a market maker129 between two clients or to invest on the other
side of a client trade, as an agency relationship would require Goldman to act in the
best interests of one client, which necessarily comes at the expense of another
client.130 As Lloyd Blankfein, former chief executive officer of Goldman, noted:
We are principals; the act of selling something is what gives us the opposite
position of what the client has. If the client asks us for a bid, and we buy it from
them, the next minute, we own it, they don’t. If they ask to buy it from us, the
next minute, they own it, we don’t. We can cover that risk, but the nature of the
principal business and market making is that we are the other side of what our
clients want to do.131

This distinction between Goldman’s role as a market maker versus its role as an
adviser is one of the most contentious aspects of imposing a fiduciary standard on

126. Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. Times (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.

com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html (calling the culture at Goldman “toxic
and destructive” and noting that the firm continually puts its own interests ahead of those of its customers).

127. H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (emphasis added).
128. See SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229, 2014 WL 61864 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2014).
129. See Sanati, supra note 113.
130. E.g., Cea, supra note 76, at 5–6.
131. R.E. Heubel, Senate Hearing: Lloyd Blankfein vs. Sen. Levin; Goldman Sachs, YouTube (Apr. 27, 2010),

available at http://youtu.be/oOpFbjHcxF0?t=3m6s.
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broker-dealers, as many fear the imposition of such duty will drastically impact the
ability of these firms to effectuate transactions and enhance the liquidity of markets.132
However, Goldman’s role in ABACUS was clearly much more than that of a
neutral market maker.133 Rather, Goldman “actively marketed” ABACUS to the long
investors and, in doing so, favored one client over the other—all while maintaining the
image that it was a neutral and objective middleman.134 Further, despite the fact that
Paulson’s “significant role” in the structuring of ABACUS was obviously adverse to the
long investors, such was never disclosed to the other investors, violating the disclosure
rules of the Exchange Act.135 Goldman not only failed to disclose Paulson’s role, but
Tourre,136 the vice president principally responsible for ABACUS, also actively misled
ACA and IKB into believing that Paulson’s interests were “closely aligned” with their
own by suggesting Paulson was an equity investor in ABACUS.137 In reality, however,
Paulson’s short position “sharply conflict[ed]” with those of the long investors.138
However, while Goldman’s role went beyond that of a neutral market maker
(hence, the subsequent SEC case against Goldman), market makers do play an
important role by helping to facilitate the sales of financial instruments, therefore
increasing the liquidity of markets. The imposition of a fiduciary standard would
significantly hinder the ability of broker-dealers to play this role in the market.139
Second, it is hard to justify why sophisticated broker-dealer customers—who
come to Goldman to be connected to other investors and have Goldman effectuate
the trade such customers were already looking for—should need fiduciary protection
at all. As Lloyd Blankfein argued before a Senate subcommittee, “What [our]
customers are buying . . . is an exposure, the thing that we are selling to them is
supposed to give them the risk they want, they are not coming to us to represent
what our views are . . . the institution clients we have wouldn’t care what our views
132. See Cea, supra note 76, at 20; Sanati, supra note 113.
133. See R.E. Heubel, Senate Hearing: Lloyd Blankfein vs. Sen. Levin; Goldman Sachs, YouTube (Apr. 27,

2010), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOpFbjHcxF0 (noting that there is a difference
between simply betting against the security as a market maker and selling a security to an investor
without disclosing their conflicting roles as both market maker and adviser).

134. Sanati, supra note 113.
135. See Press Release, supra note 106.
136. Tourre made headlines when an email he wrote to his girlfriend in 2007 was released to the public: “The

whole building is about to collapse anytime now. Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab . . . standing
in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily
understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities [sic] !!!” Tim Mullaney, Ex-Goldman
Trader ‘Fabulous Fab’ Loses Fraud Case, USA Today (Aug. 1, 2013, 9:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/money/business/2013/08/01/goldman-trader-fabrice-tourre-reaction/2609717/ (internal
quotation marks omitted).

137. See Press Release, supra note 106.
138. Id.
139. See generally Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary

Standard on Financial Advice (2013), available at http://www.fpanet.org/journal/TheImpactof
theBrokerDealerFiduciaryStandard/.
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are.”140 The difference with respect to broker-dealer customers stands in sharp
contrast to customers of investment advisers, who come to advisers looking for
professional advice on a particular security and, hence, a fiduciary standard is logical
and necessary to ensure that customer’s protection.
Finally, the associated compliance costs of implementing a fiduciary standard on
broker-dealers would result in unintended effects on broker-dealer customers. To
ensure adherence to this new standard, firms would be forced to upgrade their
compliance systems, supervision, and training systems. It would cost, on average,
roughly $5 million per firm for these firms to initially develop the necessary
infrastructure to comply with a fiduciary duty obligation, and an additional $5
million per year to maintain these systems, procedures, and programs.141 The effect
of this would harm not only the firms but, interestingly, would also spread to middleincome investors, as most firms have expressed that they will either pass on the
higher costs to clients by increasing fees or limiting their practice to clients with a
minimum amount of assets—a result surely not intended by those advocating for the
protection of customer interests.142
V.	THE SOLUTION

Despite hundreds of pages of law and thousands of pages of regulations,
the system itself is not any safer.143

The solution to the current problems in the regulation of broker-dealers lies not
in imposing yet another rule or regulation on broker-dealers, which would carry with
it significant adverse effects but, instead, lies in the enforcement of existing rules and
regulations.

140. R.E. Heubel, Senate Hearing: Lloyd Blankfein vs. Sen. Levin; Goldman Sachs, YouTube (Apr. 27, 2010),

available at http://youtu.be/oOpFbjHcxF0?t=5m3s.

141. Mark Schoeff, Jr., SIFMA to SEC: Fiduciary Rule Would Cost a Ton, Investment News (July 5, 2013,

9:41 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130705/FREE/130709966/sifma-to-secfiduciary-rule-would-cost-a-ton.

142. A study promulgated by the National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisers (NAIFA)

showed that nearly 90 percent of financial advisers believed their business costs would increase if the
SEC raised the advice bar. Three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they would pass on these
higher costs to their clients by imposing or increasing fees. Another 65 percent said they would limit
their practice to clients with a minimum amount of assets, effectively limiting financial advice to about
half of their current client base. See Letter from Susan B. Waters, Chief Exec. Officer, Nat’l Ass’n of
Ins. & Fin. Advisers, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 2, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3099.pdf.

143. This comment on Dodd-Frank came from Cornelius Hurley, director of the Center for Finance, Law

and Policy at Boston University. Sheelah Kolhatkar & Karen Weise, Dodd-Frank: The 848-Page
Financial Firewall, Bloomberg Bus. Wk. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2012-10-11/dodd-frank-the-848-page-financial-firewall.
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A. The Problem: Quick and Easy Settlements Have No Deterrent Effect

As noted above, the SEC’s case against Goldman seemed to articulate a viable
case for securities fraud violations. However, rather than fully prosecute Goldman
and hold it accountable for its actions, the SEC instead settled.144 This settlement
likely did not reflect the inadequacy of the SEC’s case against Goldman but, rather,
reflected the SEC’s desire to settle the case quickly and efficiently with minimal use
of resources.145 This policy to settle, rather than litigate, makes sense in light of the
above-mentioned policy reasons. However, less justifiable is the actual settlement
itself, in that it did not require Goldman to admit any wrongdoing.146 This type of
settlement, known as a “no admit, no deny” settlement, is typical practice for cases
involving securities violations.147
No admit, no deny settlements cause more danger in terms of customer protection
than an absence of regulatory policies ever could because they fail to provide adequate
incentive to follow existing rules. These settlements not only provide firms with a
quick and virtually painless resolution with the SEC, but they also shore up
subsequent private litigation, as private litigants cannot rely on these settlements to
bolster their allegations of wrongdoing.148 If, however, defendants were required to
admit to wrongdoing as part of the SEC settlements, plaintiffs could rely on these
settlement admissions in their complaints, helping to strengthen securities suits and,
consequently, the deterrent effect against those securities firms.149
144. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229, 2010

WL 2779309 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010).

145. William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the SEC’s “Neither Admit nor

Deny” Settlement Policy, 20 Corp. Governance Advisor 1, 1 (Mar.–Apr. 2012) (noting that the SEC’s
settlement policy “has been considered by the SEC to be necessary for efficiency and productivity”);
Rakoff ’s Revenge, Economist (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21576132-rejections-settlements-financial-institutions-are-catching-rakoffs (“Settlements
are at the heart of how the SEC handles litigation: they are quick and efficient.”).

146. Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase, institutions that were “at the

center of the financial crisis,” all settled with the SEC without admitting or denying any guilt. James B.
Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-chief-promises-tougher-line-on-cases.html.

147. Id.
148. Reckler & Denton, supra note 145, at 3; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce

Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor
Sovereignty, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1017 (2005) (describing the difficulties that private litigants bringing
securities actions face).

149. For example, a federal judge recently ruled that a class action claim by investors against JPMorgan

regarding misleading statements in offering documents for certain RMBS could go forward. This class
action certification came after JPMorgan’s $13 billion settlement with the U.S. Justice Department.
Edvard Pettersson, JPMorgan Loses Ruling on Class Certification in RMBS Lawsuit, Bloomberg (Sept.
30, 2014, 9:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/jpmorgan-rmbs-investors-canproceed-as-group-in-fraud-lawsuit.html. This settlement included a statement of facts wherein
JPMorgan “acknowledged” that it “regularly misrepresented to RMBS investors that the mortgage
loans in various securities complied with underwriting guidelines.” Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman,
N.Y. Attn’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman-led State & Federal Working Group Announces $13 Billion
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Likewise, had the SEC settlement required Goldman to admit to wrongdoing, this
would have been “vastly more damaging,” not only in terms of the bank’s ongoing legal
obligations, but also to the firm’s market value.150 In fact, if nothing else, the SEC’s
complaint against Goldman demonstrates the power an adverse public opinion can
have on a market participant.151 The day the SEC filed its complaint against Goldman,
Goldman’s share price dropped more than 13 percent, reflecting a reduction of about
$10 billion in market value.152 Further, the SEC’s subsequent settlement also
demonstrates the power of the public’s forgiveness once an issue fades from the public
eye.153 As noted above, the day the Goldman settlement was announced, Goldman’s
shares jumped around 9 percent, demonstrating the interrelated nature of public
opinion, market worth, and SEC enforcement action.154
Goldman, as a rational, self-interested market player—when weighing the pros and
cons of pursuing a particular course of conduct—will naturally choose the path that
maximizes its potential gains. The SEC’s current enforcement policy fails to provide
firms like Goldman with the necessary incentives to follow such rules because the costs
associated with rule violations currently do not outweigh the potential benefits of
pursuing a course of action that produces the highest returns for the firm. Goldman,
looking at structuring a $1 billion deal like ABACUS, will choose every time to
structure that deal in whatever way possible that makes the most gains if it views the
cost in doing so as a single $550 million dollar fine. Instead of having a deterrent effect,
then, most firms view enforcement actions by the SEC “as a cost of doing business.”155
Had the SEC fully prosecuted Goldman, or at least forced it to admit to some
wrongdoing when settling, there likely would have been a far greater impact on the
firm’s practices and policies for the future and, in effect, would have forced Goldman
to adequately police its own policies to better guard against such egregious business
practices. The incentive—and result—would come not from the top-down
implementation of a new fiduciary standard but, rather, would come internally (from
the firms themselves) as a result of these firms seeing an actual cost if they choose to
violate such rules. Rather than a quick and easy settlement, firms would view violations
Settlement with JPMorgan Chase (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/
ag-schneiderman-led-state-federal-working-group-announces-13-billion-settlement. After this
settlement, the bank noted that the settlement did not clear up all future litigation surrounding this
issue. See Kerri Ann Panchuk, How Safe Is JPMorgan from Future Litigation After Its $13B Settlement?,
HousingWire Mag. (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/28059how-safe-is-jpmorgan-from-future-litigation-after-its-13b-settlement.
150. White, supra note 118.
151. Davidoff et al., supra note 95, at 530–31.
152. Id.
153. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (2011) (noting that settlements

deprive the public “of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance”).

154. See Guerrera et al., supra note 114; Varadarajan, supra note 123; see also Smith, supra note 126 (noting

that a firm that continually puts its own needs ahead of those of its customers will ultimately fail).

155. Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup Settlement with S.E.C., N.Y. Times (Nov 28, 2011), http://www.

nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-accord-with-citi.html.
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and SEC enforcement action as causing ongoing legal obligations and continuous
decreases in the value of their stock prices, as public opinion seems to correlate with the
announcement and subsequent settlements of these firms’ “alleged” wrongdoings.
Interestingly, this push toward actually holding firms accountable for their
actions has come not from a change in the SEC’s regulatory policy, or as a result of
legislative reforms, but from the courts.
B. The Court’s Role: No More Rubber Stamping

In order for a settlement to be effective, a federal judge must first approve the
settlement.156 Historically, judges, attempting to give agencies such as the SEC
appropriate deference, have “rubber-stamped S.E.C. settlements with banks and
other defendants accused of civil fraud.”157
In November 2011, however, a federal judge for the Southern District of New
York, Judge Jed S. Rakoff, made headlines158 when he issued an order rejecting a
promised $285 million settlement of the SEC’s lawsuit against Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”), wherein the SEC brought suit against Citigroup for
misleading investors in the structuring and marketing of a CDO in violation of the
Securities Act.159 In rejecting the settlement, Judge Rakoff 160 noted that the no
156. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (2011), vacated and remanded by 752 F.3d

285 (2d Cir. 2014). At issue on appeal was the level of deference a “district court owes an agency seeking a
consent decree.” Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 293. The Second Circuit found that the district court applied an
incorrect standard of review when it asked whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in
the public interest.” Id. at 294. The court found that the correct standard of review is whether the
settlement is “fair and reasonable, with the additional requirement that the public interest would not be
disserved.” Id. (citations omitted). Specifically, the court removed the term “adequate” from the standard,
noting that adequacy applies to class action settlements, but not to agency review. Id. This decision from
the Second Circuit has essentially eliminated the idea that a court in this jurisdiction can require an
admission of liability from a defendant as a condition of approving a consent decree. David McAfee, SEC
Wants ‘No Admit, No Deny’ Pact with SAC Approved, Law360 (June 16, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://www.
law360.com/articles/548634/sec-wants-no-admit-no-deny-pact-with-sac-approved.

157. Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup Deal, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8,

2013, 1:43 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judgerakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-settlement.

158. E.g., Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup Settlement with S.E.C., N.Y. Times (Nov. 28, 2011), http://

www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-accord-with-citi.html.

159. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-

7387), 2011 WL 4965843. As noted supra in note 156, Judge Jed S. Rakoff ’s ruling was overturned, and
he ultimately was forced to approve the SEC’s settlement offer. See Wyatt, supra note 156.

160. Citigroup is not an isolated incident in the iconoclastic career of Judge Rakoff, who continually uses his

power on the bench to demand more accountability from banks. In July 2014, for example, Judge Rakoff
was charged with deciding the ultimate amount of the penalty levied on Countrywide Financial, which
Bank of America acquired in 2008, for its fraudulent scheme selling questionable mortgages during the
financial crisis, which linked bonuses to how fast bankers could originate loans. Judge Rakoff, calling
the scheme “brazen fraud,” ultimately levied a $1.26 billion penalty against Bank of America. United
States ex rel O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 12-CV-1422, 2014 WL 3734122, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014).
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admit, no deny provision failed to provide the court with enough facts relating to the
merits of the case, making it impossible to assess the adequacy of the settlement.161
Following Judge Rakoff ’s lead, other federal judges started demanding more
accountability, or at least more information, from defendants before signing off on
settlements.162 In 2011, Judge Richard J. Leon, a federal judge for the District of
Columbia, refused to approve a settlement between the SEC and IBM without more
information about the allegations.163 Judge John Kane of Denver rejected a $13
million settlement involving an alleged Ponzi scheme: “I refuse to approve penalties
against a defendant who remains defiantly mute as to the veracity of the allegations
against him.”164 New York Judge Victor Marrero blocked a record-setting deal
between the SEC and SAC Capital over insider-trading charges, noting: “There is
something counterintuitive and incongruous about settling for $600 [million] . . . if
it truly did nothing wrong.”165
Following this critique from the courts, Senator Elizabeth Warren also began
criticizing the SEC’s no admit, no deny policy. Tellingly, Senator Warren, in her
inaugural Senate Banking Committee hearing in February 2013, chose not to
question regulators about their progress in implementing Dodd-Frank but, rather,
chose instead to critique the SEC for its legal settlement policy, questioning whether
“too-big-to-fail has become too-big-for-trial.”166 In a March 2013 letter sent to U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder, then-Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, and
SEC Chair White, Warren brought up the cost to the public of such settlement
policy, noting that she was “interested in learning more about how your institution[s]
ha[ve] evaluated the cost to the public of settling cases without requiring an admission
of guilt rather than pursuing more aggressive actions.”167
C. The SEC’s Response

Due perhaps to such criticism from the courts and from commentators such as
Senator Warren, the SEC has indicated a potential retreat from its no admit, no deny

161. Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. As stated supra in note 156, however, the Second Circuit noted that

Judge Rakoff was incorrect in assessing the “adequacy” of the settlement at all, as this assessment
exceeded his permissible scope of review.

162. Lattman, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Rakoff ’s Revenge, supra note 145.
165. Id.
166. Cheyenne Hopkins, Elizabeth Warren Decries ‘Too-Big-for-Trial’ Approach to Banks, Bloomberg (Feb.

14, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-02-14/elizabeth-warren-decriestoo-big-for-trial-approach-to-banks/.

167. Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren, to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.

Reserve Sys., Eric Holder, U.S. Attn’y Gen., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May
14, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/warren.ltrtoregulatorsre2-14-13hrg1.pdf.
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policy.168 In the summer of 2013, newly appointed SEC Chair White noted: “[I]n the
interest of public accountability, you need admissions. . . . Defendants are going to
have to own up to their conduct on the public record. . . . This will help with
deterrence, and it’s a matter of strengthening our hand in terms of enforcement.”169
Actions do speak louder than words but, in July 2013, the SEC rejected a no
admit, no deny settlement offer with hedge fund manager Phil Falcone and his hedge
fund Harbinger Capital Partners, both of whom were accused of market manipulation
and other acts of misconduct.170 The SEC instead required a settlement wherein
Falcone and Harbinger admitted to acts of wrongdoing, paid an $18 million fine,
and banned Falcone from the industry for a period of five years.171 Notably, however,
neither Harbinger Capital nor Falcone actually admitted that their conduct violated
the securities laws, but did admit that they acted “recklessly.”172
Further, in September 2013, the SEC’s settlement with JPMorgan Chase
regarding the “London Whale” trading debacle173 required the bank to pay a $920
million fine and to admit that it failed to oversee trading that led to a $6 billion loss
for investors.174 In a separate case, the bank also admitted its traders engaged in
168. Reckler & Denton, supra note 145, at 1–2. For a discussion of Senator Warren’s criticism of the SEC’s

no admit, no deny policy, see Hopkins, supra note 166.

169. James B. Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-chief-promises-tougher-line-on-cases.html.

170. Emily Flitter & Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Rejects Settlement with Fund Manager Phil Falcone, Reuters (July

19, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://w w w.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-sec-falcone-settlementidUSBRE96I0OF20130719.

171. Julia La Roche, Hedge Funder Falcone to Pay $18 Million Fine and Accept 5-Year Ban from Industry, Bus.

Insider (Aug. 19, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/phil-falcone-sec-settlement-2013-8.

172. Mary P. Hansen, “Neither Admit nor Deny” Settlements at the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission),

Nat’l L. Rev. (April 3, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/neither-admit-nor-deny-settlementssec-securities-and-exchange-commission. (“[T]he SEC takes the position that ‘recklessness’ is sufficient
to prove a fraud violation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”).

173. In short, in February 2012, JPMorgan faced nearly $65 billion worth of losses on certain derivatives. To

drive down the price of the derivatives in an attempt to prevent further losses, the bank sold roughly $7
billion of the instruments short in a day, creating “artificial selling pressure.” Tim Mullaney, ‘London
Whale’ Costs JPMorgan $100M More, USA Today (Oct. 16, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2013/10/16/jpmorgan-cftc-fine-london-whale/2993203/. A later Senate report
analyzing the matter uncovered systemic failures in the bank’s internal control system: Risk limits, for
example, were breached more than 330 times before the bank switched to a more lenient risk-evaluation
formula. The Senate report noted: “[T]he whale trades exposed a bank culture in which risk limit
breaches were routinely disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized or downplayed, and risk
evaluation models were targeted by bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital
requirements.” Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Aff., JPMorgan Chase Whale Traders: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses 7
(Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/
chase-whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses.

174. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70458 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://

www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf. Specifically, JPMorgan was accused of violating the
books-and-records provision of the federal securities laws, a provision that prevents companies from
misstating their financial results and also requires adequate systems of internal controls to detect and
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“reckless” conduct and market manipulation with London trades.175 After the
settlement, the bank announced it would spend $1 billion to improve internal controls
to prevent such a crisis from happening again.176
However, while the Falcone/Harbinger and JPMorgan settlements represent a
slight change from the SEC’s long-standing no admit, no deny settlement policy, it is
clear that such settlements are still the norm.177 For example, in September 2013, the
same month the SEC required JPMorgan to admit to some wrongdoing, the agency
also released an announcement of settlements with twenty-two other firms accused of
antifraud violations178—each of which contained the no admit, no deny provision.179
Rather than relying on Dodd-Frank’s sweeping reforms to save the public from
Wall Street, reform must instead come from holding companies that commit
egregious fraud or pose serious threats to investors accountable for their wrongdoings.
A tougher approach to settlements will likely have much more of an impact on these
firms, and will provide an actual incentive for firms to change their current business
practices than would the imposition of yet another regulation.
VI. Conclusion

Dodd-Frank set out to reform Wall Street. Part of this reform included the
possibility of imposing a uniform fiduciary duty on broker-dealers. This call for reform,
in part, stemmed from what was viewed as a regulatory gap in the financial industry,
resulting in significant threats to investors such as those exposed by the ABACUS
deal. Since the “problem” was too little regulation, Congress crafted a “solution” via
Dodd-Frank to fill these so-called regulatory gaps in the financial world.
Rather than imposing yet another rule or duty on these already heavily regulated
firms, the SEC instead should start adequately enforcing the current rules and
regulations. Imposing a fiduciary standard on broker-dealers would not only adversely
prevent traders from fraudulently preparing financial statements. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n R. 17a-3,
17a-4 (2012); see also Books and Records Requirements for Brokers and Dealers Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44993 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/34-44992.htm.
175. Silla Brush, JPMorgan to Pay $100 Million Fine on CFTC London Whale Claim, Bloomberg (Oct. 16,

2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-16/jpmorgan-to-pay-100-million-tosettle-cftc-claims-chilton-says.html.

176. Id.
177. In a memo written by the Enforcement Division of the SEC, then-co-directors George Canellos and

Andrew Ceresny noted “most” cases would be settled without defendants admitting or denying any
wrongdoing, and further suggested the SEC would only require admissions of wrongdoing when it would
be in the public interest. Kara Scannell, SEC Considers Policy Shift on Admissions of Wrongdoing, Fin. Times
(June 19, 2013, 4:51 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a93d5dc-d882-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3RC97GWdE.

178. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges 23 Firms with Short Selling Violations in

Crackdown on Potential Manipulation in Advance of Stock Offerings (Sept. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539804376.

179. E.g., In re Blackthorn Investment Group, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 70392 (Sept. 16, 2013),

available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70392.pdf.
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affect the role of broker-dealers in the market, but merely kicks the can down the
road because it fails to confront the root of the problem: the pursuit of unfettered
profit at all costs. If customer protection is truly the goal, then the self-interested
culture of these firms needs to change. This change will come not from a top-down
mandate but, rather, internally from a change in the culture of the firm itself.
The ABACUS deal, then, is important not because it demonstrated the
shortcomings of the current regulatory system absent a fiduciary standard, but
because it demonstrates the shortcomings of the current SEC no admit, no deny
settlement policy. Such settlement policy, while resulting in headline wins for the
SEC, fails to have any deterrent effect. Without forcing firms to admit to any
wrongdoing, the public spotlight on these firms that appears at the onset of a case
virtually disappears along with the settlement of the case and effectively eliminates
firms’ ongoing legal obligations. As seen with the Goldman settlement, such a policy
effectively allows a firm to buy back its reputation without necessarily forcing it to
engage in better business practices.
If the current momentum toward actually holding firms engaged in wrongdoing
accountable for their actions continues, then such a change will reform the financial
regulatory system. It will incentivize firms to adequately police themselves to prevent
rule violations, as they will no longer view breaking the rules as the cost of doing
business.
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